In April 2024, L Catterton — the private equity firm backed by LVMH and the Arnault family office — announced the acquisition of a majority stake in KIKO Milano from the founding Percassi family. Financial terms were not officially disclosed, but Italian newspaper Il Sole 24 Ore reported the transaction valued the business at approximately €1.4 billion.

KIKO generated approximately €800 million in net revenue in 2023, up nearly 20% year-over-year. At €1.4 billion enterprise value, the implied EV/Revenue multiple is approximately 1.75×. For a mass-market colour cosmetics brand with this revenue scale and growth rate, that multiple reflects realistic positioning: above commodity mass market (0.8–1.2×), but below the premium brand multiples that LVMH's own portfolio commands.

The retained minority: structure matters

The Percassi family retained a "significant" minority stake in KIKO and Antonio Percassi retained the position of company President. This structure — majority to financial buyer, meaningful minority retained by founder — is increasingly common in European family business exits, and for good reason.

From the family's perspective, the retained stake allows participation in the upside of what they believe will be a transformative growth phase. From the buyer's perspective, founder retention reduces key-man risk and signals confidence in the business. It also typically reduces the purchase price required to complete the transaction: a founder selling 60–70% for a price that implies 100% ownership is effectively accepting a lower current valuation in exchange for a second bite at the apple.

Why L Catterton, not a strategic buyer?

KIKO had obvious strategic buyers: L'Oréal, Coty, Shiseido, Intercos. None appear to have been the preferred exit route. The family chose L Catterton — a financial buyer — for reasons that reflect the specific character of the opportunity.

First: L Catterton's consumer network. The firm manages approximately $35 billion of consumer-focused capital and has invested in Birkenstock, Elemis, Il Makiage, and over 275 consumer brands. Their operational team includes John Demsey, the former Group President of Estée Lauder, who was appointed as strategic advisor to KIKO. This is not generic PE — it is a firm with genuine sector expertise and distribution relationships.

Second: the US expansion thesis. KIKO's Americas revenues grew 43% in 2023 — the fastest-growing geography. A strategic buyer from Europe would have prioritised European consolidation and rationalised KIKO's retail network. L Catterton's most valuable contribution is the US market knowledge and distribution infrastructure to execute the US rollout.

The Italian family business exit dynamic

Italy has approximately 800,000 family-controlled SMEs with revenues above €10 million. According to Mergermarket, PE activity in Italian private equity reached a five-year high in 2024. The KIKO transaction illustrates the specific dynamics of a high-quality Italian consumer brand exit: the best buyers are not domestic Italian corporates but international PE firms with global distribution networks.

The premium L Catterton paid versus a theoretical domestic acquirer reflects the higher value creation potential of the international thesis. A domestic buyer would have extracted operational synergies. L Catterton will build a new market. Those are fundamentally different value creation paths, and they command different multiples.

In 2024, two logistics companies sold within months of each other. One was one of the largest freight networks in Europe. The other was a mid-sized cold-chain specialist. The larger company sold at 7.5× EBITDA. The smaller one sold at 14.5× EBITDA. nearly double.

The larger company was DB Schenker, acquired by DSV for €14.3 billion in a full cash transaction. The smaller one was Frigo-Trans, acquired by UPS. Same sector. Same year. Radically different multiples.

Understanding why is one of the most valuable things a business owner can do before deciding to sell.

The two deals side by side

Why did DSV pay only 7.5×?

Seven and a half times EBITDA is not a low multiple for a business of this size. The average EV/EBITDA for transport and logistics SMEs in DACH sits between 3.5× and 5.5×. DSV paid well above the market average for mid-sized players.

But the question is not whether 7.5× is low in absolute terms. The question is what capped it. and what business owners can learn from it.

Three factors compressed the multiple. First: integration complexity. DB Schenker is enormous. Integrating it into DSV's network requires years of systems alignment, cultural change, and operational restructuring. Buyers price that execution risk into the multiple. Second: revenue overlap. DSV and DB Schenker serve many of the same large corporate clients. An acquirer does not get 100% of that revenue. some customers will consolidate. Third: regulatory exposure. A deal of this size required approval from multiple competition authorities across jurisdictions. Uncertainty has a cost, and buyers discount for it.

Why did UPS pay 14.5× for Frigo-Trans?

Frigo-Trans operates ultra-low-temperature transport. a highly specialised segment with significant barriers to entry. The equipment is expensive and specialised, the operational expertise takes years to build, and the regulatory requirements are demanding.

That specialisation creates three things a buyer values above everything else: it removes competitive acquisition alternatives, it generates pricing power that generic operators do not have, and it produces contract-based, recurring revenue that is highly predictable.

What the sector benchmarks tell us

The DACH transport and logistics market in 2024 showed a wide dispersion of multiples. not because the market was inconsistent, but because the drivers of value vary dramatically by sub-sector. General road freight: 3.5–5.5×. E-commerce and last-mile specialists: 10–12×. Cold-chain and ultra-specialised segments: 12–14.5×.

The pattern is consistent: the more defensible the niche, the higher the multiple. The more commoditised the service, the lower. This holds across geographies and deal sizes.