Market Pulse
10Y Bund (Rf)2.68%ECB
ERP EU avg5.84%Damodaran 2026
S&P Fwd P/E20.8×above hist. avg
EU Deal Vol−14%YoY
Software EV/EBITDA24.5×Jan 2026
CH CGT0%lowest EU
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M&A Intelligence. Case Study No. 05
Techem sold at 24.5× EBIT. What infrastructure premium looks like.
Partners Group exited Germany's largest submetering company for €6.7B after 6 years of ownership. The EBIT multiple tells you more than the EBITDA one.
Sellers
Partners Group, CDPQ, Ontario Teachers'
Buyers
Partners Group Infra, GIC, TPG Rise, Mubadala
EV
€6.7 billion
EV / EBIT
24.5× (2024 EBIT)
EV / Revenue
~6.6× (revenue >€1B)
Closed
Q4 2024 / 2025

In mid-2024, Partners Group announced the sale of Techem — Germany's dominant provider of smart submetering solutions for residential buildings — at an enterprise value of €6.7 billion. The deal implied a multiple of 24.5× EBIT and approximately 6.6× revenue. Both figures sit well above sector averages for industrial services companies.

The buyer consortium — Partners Group Infrastructure, GIC, TPG Rise Climate, and Mubadala — reflects who is willing to pay infrastructure multiples: sovereign wealth funds and infrastructure-mandate capital, not classic PE buyout funds. That distinction matters enormously for how the asset was priced.

Why the PE seller became an infrastructure asset

Partners Group originally acquired Techem in 2018 through its private equity business. By the time it sold in 2024-2025, the buyer paid through the infrastructure mandate. The business had been repositioned.

Techem's core service — submetering heat and water consumption across 13 million residential units — has four characteristics that infrastructure investors prize above all others: regulatory mandate (EU energy efficiency directives require submetering), high switching costs (replacing installed devices and contracts across hundreds of thousands of properties is prohibitively expensive), recurring revenue (multiyear contracts with utilities and property managers), and macro tailwind (the European energy transition makes building efficiency measurement mandatory, not optional).

Partners Group spent six years converting a serviceable PE asset into an infrastructure-grade cashflow machine. EBITDA grew approximately 50% during their ownership. Revenue crossed €1 billion.

KEY INSIGHT
Infrastructure vs PE: the multiple gap
Infrastructure capital typically pays 20–35% more for the same EBITDA than PE buyout funds. The premium reflects lower return requirements, longer hold periods, and a preference for regulated or quasi-regulated cashflows. Repositioning a business as infrastructure-eligible before sale is one of the highest-value pre-sale moves available to a sophisticated seller.
Infrastructure EV/EBITDA: 18–28× · PE Buyout EV/EBITDA: 12–16× · Gap: +40–75%

The EBIT vs EBITDA distinction

The deal was disclosed at 24.5× EBIT, not EBITDA. This is unusual and worth unpacking. For a capital-intensive business with significant depreciation on installed devices (Techem has 62 million devices in the field), EBIT is materially lower than EBITDA. If Techem's D&A margin was approximately 10–12% of revenue, the implied EBITDA multiple would sit closer to 14–17× — still above sector averages, but less striking than the headline number.

Buyers structuring infrastructure acquisitions often quote EBIT multiples because they intend to maintain the asset base, not harvest it. For them, depreciation is a real cash cost, not an add-back.

What this means for non-infrastructure businesses

Most SMEs will not sell to a GIC or Mubadala. But the Techem case illustrates a principle that applies at every deal size: the buyer type determines the multiple as much as the business fundamentals.

A logistics business with long-term contracts and minimal churn may not be positioned as infrastructure — but if it can be presented to a family office or long-duration PE fund rather than a classic 5-year buyout fund, the valuation conversation starts from a different baseline. Knowing which buyer universe your business fits before going to market is not optional. It is the core of sell-side strategy.

The EV/Revenue signal

At approximately 6.6× revenue, Techem's exit multiple is far above what most industrial services companies achieve (typically 0.8–1.5×). The premium comes from two things: the software-like economics of the recurring service business (once a submetering contract is installed, the annual fee rolls in with minimal variable cost), and the ESG mandate of the new buyer consortium. Infrastructure funds managing capital from sovereign wealth funds face increasing pressure to deploy into assets with credible climate theses. Techem is one of very few assets at this scale with a direct, measurable link to EU building decarbonisation.

Author's POV

The headline multiple here is technically 24.5× EBIT, which sounds extraordinary. It is, once you understand it correctly. But the more important lesson is not the number itself — it is who wrote the cheque and why.

Partners Group had six years to prepare this exit. They did not just grow the business. They systematically reduced the buyer universe needed to one where return requirements are lower and hold periods longer. When GIC and Mubadala are competing for an asset, the price discovery process is structurally different from a five-way PE auction.

For business owners: the question is not just "what is my EBITDA multiple?" It is "which type of capital finds my business most attractive, and have I done the work to make myself legible to them?" A family-owned industrial business with 80% contract renewal rates is not a PE asset. It may be a family office asset, or an infrastructure-adjacent asset for a long-duration buyer. Same business, very different conversation.

The best exit advisors start with buyer positioning before they start with valuation. The multiple is an output of who is in the room, not an input.

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YPE html> CS05 · M&A Intelligence
Market Pulse
10Y Bund (Rf)2.68%ECB
ERP EU avg5.84%Damodaran 2026
S&P Fwd P/E20.8×above hist. avg
EU Deal Vol−14%YoY
Software EV/EBITDA24.5×Jan 2026
CH CGT0%lowest EU
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M&A Intelligence. Case Study No. 01
DSV acquires DB Schenker at 7.5× EBITDA. why not 12×?
The largest logistics deal of 2024 paid less than half the multiple of a smaller specialist sold the same year. Here is what the numbers actually tell you about how buyers price scale versus specialisation.
Buyer
DSV A/S
Target
DB Schenker
EV / EBITDA
7.5×
Consideration
Cash · €14.3B

In 2024, two logistics companies sold within months of each other. One was one of the largest freight networks in Europe. The other was a mid-sized cold-chain specialist. The larger company sold at 7.5× EBITDA. The smaller one sold at 14.5× EBITDA. nearly double.

The larger company was DB Schenker, acquired by DSV for €14.3 billion in a full cash transaction. The smaller one was Frigo-Trans, acquired by UPS. Same sector. Same year. Radically different multiples.

Understanding why is one of the most valuable things a business owner can do before deciding to sell.

The two deals side by side

ItemDB SchenkerFrigo-Trans
BuyerDSV A/S (Denmark)UPS (USA)
GeographyPan-EuropeanGermany / Europe
Enterprise Value€14.3 billionNot disclosed
EV / EBITDA7.5×14.5×
ConsiderationCashCash
SectorGeneral freight forwardingUltra-low-temperature logistics
Year closed20242024

Why did DSV pay only 7.5×?

Seven and a half times EBITDA is not a low multiple for a business of this size. The average EV/EBITDA for transport and logistics SMEs in DACH sits between 3.5× and 5.5×. DSV paid well above the market average for mid-sized players.

But the question is not whether 7.5× is low in absolute terms. The question is what capped it. and what business owners can learn from it.

Three factors compressed the multiple. First: integration complexity. DB Schenker is enormous. Integrating it into DSV's network requires years of systems alignment, cultural change, and operational restructuring. Buyers price that execution risk into the multiple. Second: revenue overlap. DSV and DB Schenker serve many of the same large corporate clients. An acquirer does not get 100% of that revenue. some customers will consolidate. Third: regulatory exposure. A deal of this size required approval from multiple competition authorities across jurisdictions. Uncertainty has a cost, and buyers discount for it.

Why did UPS pay 14.5× for Frigo-Trans?

Frigo-Trans operates ultra-low-temperature transport. a highly specialised segment with significant barriers to entry. The equipment is expensive and specialised, the operational expertise takes years to build, and the regulatory requirements are demanding.

That specialisation creates three things a buyer values above everything else: it removes competitive acquisition alternatives, it generates pricing power that generic operators do not have, and it produces contract-based, recurring revenue that is highly predictable.

Scale alone does not drive premium multiples. Specialisation, barriers to entry, and revenue predictability do. A CHF 5M business with 80% recurring revenue and a defensible niche will often command a higher multiple than a CHF 50M business that any well-capitalised competitor could replicate.

What the sector benchmarks tell us

The DACH transport and logistics market in 2024 showed a wide dispersion of multiples. not because the market was inconsistent, but because the drivers of value vary dramatically by sub-sector. General road freight: 3.5–5.5×. E-commerce and last-mile specialists: 10–12×. Cold-chain and ultra-specialised segments: 12–14.5×.

The pattern is consistent: the more defensible the niche, the higher the multiple. The more commoditised the service, the lower. This holds across geographies and deal sizes.

Author's POV

I have sat in rooms where buyers price businesses like these. The conversation almost never starts with the P&L. It starts with two questions: "Who else could do this?" and "How confident are we in the forward cash flows?"

DB Schenker is a great business. But DSV could have built similar capabilities over time, or acquired alternatives. Frigo-Trans operated in a segment where you either have the infrastructure and the certifications, or you do not. There is no organic path to what they built. That scarcity is what drives the multiple from 7× to 14×.

For a business owner reading this: the question is not whether your business is profitable. It is whether what you have built is genuinely difficult to replicate. If a well-funded competitor could approximate your position in three years, expect a mid-range multiple. If they cannot. because of your relationships, your certifications, your customer contracts, or your operational expertise. expect a premium.

The most expensive mistake I see sellers make is going to market before they have documented and articulated why their business is hard to replicate. Buyers will not do that work for you.

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