In the same year that DSV paid 7.5× EBITDA for DB Schenker. one of the largest logistics acquisitions in European history. UPS paid nearly double that multiple for Frigo-Trans, a mid-sized cold-chain specialist operating in Germany and across Europe.
The two deals are among the most instructive comparisons available in recent European M&A. Same sector. Same geography. Same year. The difference in multiple. almost exactly 2×. was not a pricing anomaly. It was a precise reflection of the difference in what each business represented to its buyer.
What Frigo-Trans was
Frigo-Trans operated ultra-low-temperature logistics. transport and storage of pharmaceutical products, biological samples, and temperature-sensitive goods at temperatures as low as −80°C. This is a segment of logistics that looks, from the outside, similar to conventional cold chain. It is not.
The infrastructure required is fundamentally different: purpose-built vehicles with cryogenic systems, specialised loading equipment, temperature-monitoring technology, and trained handling staff. The regulatory requirements are demanding. GDP (Good Distribution Practice) certification, pharmaceutical-grade documentation, chain-of-custody protocols for each shipment. The certifications take years to obtain and maintain.
The customer relationships are long-term and contractual. Pharmaceutical companies and research institutions do not change their ultra-low-temperature logistics provider lightly. The switching cost. recertifying a new provider, revalidating transport protocols, updating regulatory filings. is significant. Frigo-Trans had no single customer above 15% of revenue, and the average customer relationship was over seven years.
Why UPS paid 14.5×
UPS was not buying a logistics business. They were buying a capability they could not replicate organically within a relevant timeframe. To build what Frigo-Trans had built. from infrastructure, to certifications, to customer relationships. would have taken UPS five to seven years and significant capital. The acquisition compressed that timeline to zero.
That is the definition of a scarcity premium. When a buyer has no viable alternative to acquisition, and when the target has genuine barriers to entry that protect its position, the buyer's willingness to pay is constrained only by the value the target creates inside the acquirer's business. not by what comparable transactions suggest.
| Factor | DB Schenker (7.5×) | Frigo-Trans (14.5×) |
|---|---|---|
| Buyer's organic alternative | Possible, over time | Not viable within 5–7 years |
| Barriers to entry | Low-moderate | High (certs, infrastructure, time) |
| Revenue predictability | Moderate (spot + contract) | High (long-term contracts) |
| Customer concentration | Moderate-high | Low. no customer above 15% |
| Integration risk | High (scale, culture, systems) | Low (complementary, not overlapping) |
What this means for smaller businesses
Frigo-Trans was not a large business by logistics standards. The principle it illustrates applies at any size. A CHF 3 million EBITDA business that operates in a specialised niche. with regulatory certifications, long-term contracts, and no obvious organic path for a strategic buyer. can command a higher multiple than a CHF 10 million EBITDA business in a commoditised segment.
The question to ask about your own business is not "what is my EBITDA?" It is: "What would it cost a buyer to build what I have built, and how long would it take?" The answer to that question is the foundation of your negotiating position.
If the answer is "they could replicate it in 18 months with moderate capital", expect a market multiple. If the answer is "they cannot replicate it without losing 3 to 5 years and significant competitive ground", expect a premium.